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FLEXIBLE ARBITRATION FOR THE DEVELOPING WORLD:
PIERO FORESTI AND THE FUTURE OF BILATERAL
INVESTMENT TREATIES IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH
Andrew Friedman*
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past few decades, international trade has become inundated
with bilateral investment treaties (BITs), “agreements between two
countries for the reciprocal encouragement, promotion and protection of
investments in each other's territories by companies based in either
country.”1 Capital exporting and capital importing states have begun to
use BITs as a precursor to investment. In fact, as of 2005, more than 140
countries were party to at least one such treaty, most having agreed to
considerably more.2 Today, well over 2,000 BITs exist and there is little
doubt that the growth trend will continue.3 The international system of
BITs has become extremely important, affecting not only ultra rich and
poor countries, but countries at all stages of development. The rapid
expansion of BITs around the world has raised an important issue in
international law: whether entering into a BIT precludes a country from
passing legislation to correct past social injustices. This particular issue
was recently addressed in Piero Foresti v. Republic of South Africa, an
arbitral case in which the parties ultimately settled outside of the tribunal,
thereby leaving important questions unanswered pertaining to the future
development of the Global South.4
The Foresti case began on November 8, 2006 when several Italian
citizens and a number of Luxembourg-based corporations engaged in
mining in South Africa registered a request for arbitration with the
*Andrew Friedman graduated Cum Laude from the University of Illinois College of Law and
is currently pursuing an LLM in International Law and Development at the University of
Nottingham. A special thanks to Josh Berrett and all the other editors for their hard work on this
article.
1
What
are
BITs?,
U.N.
CONF.
ON
TRADE
&
DEV,
http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/Page____1006.aspx (last updated Aug. 17, 2004).
2
Calvin A. Hamilton & Paula I. Rochwerger, Trade and Investment: Foreign Direct
Investment through Bilateral and Multilateral Treaties, 18 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 1, 3 (2005).
3
ICSID Database of Bilateral Investment Treaties, INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF
INVESTMENT DISP., http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet (follow “Bilateral Investment
Treaties” hyperlink; follow “View All” hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 25, 2010).
4
See Piero Foresti, et al. v. Republic of S. Afr., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/1, Award of the
Tribunal
(Aug.
4,
2010),
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=GenCaseDtlsRH&actionVal=ListConcl
uded (scroll to number 185; follow “English(Original)” hyperlink) [hereinafter Foresti].
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International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)
against the Republic of South Africa.5 The case concerned the Black
Economic Empowerment (BEE) provisions of the Minerals and
Petroleum Resources Development Act of 2002 (MPRDA), which was
enacted after South Africa transitioned from an apartheid system to a
democratic government.6 Pursuant to authority granted under the
MPRDA, the South African government seized ownership of all natural
resources located in the country,7 and thereafter determined the rights of
mineral exploitation through a system of licensing.8 Companies that
previously held private mineral rights were forced to apply for licenses to
continue their operations.9 While these laws were designed to alleviate
the effects of the historical racial inequity that occurred under the
apartheid system, the claimants challenged the policies as a violation of
South Africa’s international obligations under its BITs and claimed that
they amounted to expropriation under international law.10
The Foresti case is vastly important to the future of a democratic
South Africa, and also has wide implications for the development of the
entire Global South. As the expansion of BITs continues, the question
posed in the Foresti arbitration is likely to come up quite frequently. As
stated by various human rights organizations involved in the Foresti
arbitration, the issue at hand “is the scope of the post-apartheid South
African government’s ability, under domestic and international law, to
implement legislative and policy decisions designed to redress the
devastating socio-economic legacy left by apartheid.”11 More generally
stated, the issue is whether entering into BITs can prevent a developing
country from using certain types of legislation to correct past social
injustices. The answer to such a question is likely to have tremendous
repercussions throughout the developing world.
This article is divided into several parts. Part II will give a brief
overview of apartheid and its social and economic effects on South
Africa to set the stage for a discussion of the Foresti arbitration. Part III
will discuss the South African government’s efforts to cure the social and
5

Id. ¶ 1.
See Piero Foresti, et al. v. Republic of S. Afr., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/1, Petition for
Limited Participation as Non-Disputing Parties in Terms of Articles 41(3), 27, 39, and 35 of the
Additional
Facility
Rules,
¶
4.1-4.2
(July
17,
2009),
available
at
http://www.investmenttreatynews.org/documents/p/214/download.aspx [hereinafter Human Rights
NDP Petition].
7
See Damon Vis-Dunbar, South African court judgment bolsters expropriation charge over
Black Economic Empowerment legislation in the mining sector, INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS (Mar.
23, 2009), http://www.investmenttreatynews.org/cms/news/archive/2009/03/23/south-african-courtjudgment-bolsters-expropriation-charge-over-black-economic-empowerment-legislation.aspx.
8
See id.
9
See id.
10
See Human Rights NDP Petition, supra note 6, ¶ 4.2.
11
Id.
6
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economic effects of apartheid. Part IV will describe how these efforts
led to the Foresti case and analyze the expropriations claims in that case.
Part V will discuss the traditional test used by arbitral tribunals in
expropriation cases under international law and will argue that ICSID
should abandon this traditional test in favor of a more flexible threefactor test. Part VI will then discuss the possible implications for
developing countries if ICSID were to adopt the proposed three-factor
test for analyzing expropriation claims. Part VII will conclude.
II. APARTHEID AND ITS SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC EFFECTS ON
SOUTH AFRICA
In addition to the post-apartheid South African government’s move
toward economic security and development through the signing of BITs,
the new government also aimed to alleviate the societal devastation that
resulted from more than a half-century of apartheid governance. Through
a system of apartheid, white South Africans systematically
disadvantaged black South Africans—the majority of South Africa’s
population—in many ways. Today, this system of apartheid continues to
influence South Africa’s economic development long after the
establishment of the democratic government.12
In addition to the visible problems associated with extreme poverty,
hunger, and lack of shelter, many less apparent problems continue to
limit the opportunities of black South Africans. Under apartheid, the
South African government took measures to ensure that black South
Africans were not able to become self-reliant.13 The apartheid South
African government denied black South Africans the possibility of
entrepreneurship, self-employment, and skills development.14 The
apartheid South African government also confined Black South Africans
to homeland areas that were incredibly impoverished and lacked proper
business infrastructure.15 These disadvantages severely limited the ability
of black South Africans to compete in the new dynamic business
environment that arose after the fall of the apartheid system.16

12
See Bureau of African Affairs, Background Note: South Africa, U.S. DEP’T OF ST.,
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2898.htm (last updated Nov. 17, 2010).
13
See SOUTH AFRICA’S ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION: A STRATEGY FOR BROAD-BASED
BLACK
ECONOMIC
EMPOWERMENT
¶¶
1.2,
2.2.3,
available
at
http://www.kznhealth.gov.za/TED/strategy.pdf [hereinafter BEE STRATEGY DOC.].
14
See id.
15
See id.
16
See BEE STRATEGY DOC., supra note 13.
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At the time the Foresti arbitration was filed, the problems stemming
from apartheid in were deeply entrenched in South African society and
there remained a large disparity in income between black and white
South Africans. According to the United Nations Development Program,
in 2003, 62% of Black South Africans lived below the national poverty
line, while only 1.5% of White South Africans lived below that level.17
Similarly, only 45% of Black South Africans lived in formal housing
while 89% of White South Africans enjoyed this basic human right.18
Moreover, while Black South Africans comprised 79% of South Africa’s
population, they owned only 18% of the country’s land at the end of
2008.19
Besides creating moral and social problems, the post-apartheid South
African government also regarded the disparity between white and black
South Africans as a significant impediment to economic growth. A
strategy paper published by the post-apartheid South African
government’s Department of Trade and Industry states that “[n]o
economy can grow by excluding any part of its people and an economy
that is not growing cannot integrate all of its citizens in a meaningful
way.”20 The South African government chose to address the disparity
problem caused by apartheid, in part, by implementing a series of
policies known as Black Economic Empowerment (BEE).
III. BLACK ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT
BEE policies came to pervade many levels of South African
legislation. The South African government’s Department of Trade and
Industry created a list of policy objectives, which included (1) increasing
black South African ownership interest in enterprises in both standard
and priority sectors of the economy, (2) increasing the number of new
black South African enterprises, and (3) increasing the number of black
South Africans in executive management positions.21 To accomplish
these objectives, the post-apartheid South African government was given
broad powers to legislate and regulate.22
These broad powers allowed the government to include BEE
provisions in many future South African laws. These laws addressed
17
Human Rights NDP Petition, supra note 6, ¶ 4.3 (quoting UNDP Human Development
Report 2003 and Yolandi Groenawald, Who owns what land in South Africa?, MAIL & GUARDIAN
ONLINE (Jan 23. 2009), http://www.mg.co.za/article/2009-01-23-who-owns-what-land-in-southafrica).
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
BEE STRATEGY DOC., supra note 13, ¶ 3.4.4.1.
21
See id. ¶ 3.3.
22
See id. ¶¶ 3.5.2, 3.5.3.
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incredibly diverse issues including equity of employment, mining rights
and mandatory divestments.23 The most controversial bills containing
BEE policies were those requiring the transfer of certain percentages of
enterprise ownership to black South Africans. For example, the MPRDA,
mentioned above, initially required Black South African enterprises to
own 51% of the nation’s mining industry.24 This BEE policy was an
attempt to alleviate some of the economic problems associated with
apartheid and to allow the country to reach its full economic potential by
utilizing its entire population.25 In response to much opposition regarding
the MPRDA’s 51% requirement, the post-apartheid South African
government reduced the percentage of ownership by black South
Africans to 26%. Despite this change to the MPRDA, the bill led to the
Foresti arbitration.26
IV. THE CASE
One of MPRDA’s stated objectives is to “substantially and
meaningfully expand opportunities for historically disadvantaged
persons, including women and communities, to enter the mineral and
petroleum industries and to benefit from the exploitation of the nation’s
mineral and petroleum resources.”27 Additionally, the MPRDA contains
many BEE provisions that would create large-scale changes to the
mining and petroleum industries. As previously mentioned, one of the
most controversial sections of the MPRDA is the mandated 26%
ownership stake in mineral exploitation by black South Africans.28
Nevertheless, for international investors, this was not the most disturbing
provision.
The MPRDA also created a new system by which mineral rights
would be distributed to mining enterprises. Under the previous mining
law, the South African Minerals Act of 1991 (SAMA), private
enterprises that owned land with natural resources also owned those
resources. However, under the new system created by the MPRDA, the
post-apartheid South African government seized ownership of all natural
23

LUKE ERIC PETERSON, SOUTH AFRICA’S BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES: IMPLICATIONS
DEVELOPMENT AND HUMAN RIGHTS, 16 (November, 2006), available at
http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/global/04137-20080708.pdf (citing DEP’T OF TRADE INDUS.
STRATEGY DOC, A STRATEGY FOR BROAD-BASED BLACK EMPOWERMENT, available at
http://www.dti.gov.za/bee/complete.pdf).
24
Id.
25
See BEE STRATEGY DOC., supra note 13, ¶¶ 1.1-1.2.
26
See Foresti, supra note 4, ¶ 54.
27
Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002 s. 2(d) (S.Afr.).
28
See PETERSON, supra note 23.
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resources in the country.29 The post-apartheid South African government
then determined the rights of mineral exploitation through a system of
licensing.30 Private enterprises that previously held mineral rights were
given the opportunity to apply for licenses to continue their operations.31
However, many of the private enterprises complained that the rights
given through the licensing procedure were not the same as the rights
they previously enjoyed under SAMA. Mineral exploitation companies
found many provisions of the MPRDA upsetting, including a five-year
limit on licenses, after which companies must reapply.32 Furthermore,
such licenses could be denied for a broad range of reasons.33
The transition from a system of private ownership of mineral rights
established under SAMA to a new system of government ownership
under the MPRDA led to the Foresti arbitration. As mentioned above, in
Foresti, a group of Italian nationals and Luxembourg-based companies
(claimants) filed for arbitration with ICSID on November 8, 2006,
alleging that the MPRDA’s system of government ownership of
previously held private mineral rights amounted to expropriation.34
After the filing, four non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
requested permission from ICSID to jointly file amicus curiae with the
tribunal pursuant to ICSID Additional Facility rules 41(3) 27, 39 and
35.35 Of the four NGOs, two were South African and two were
international. The two South African NGOs were the Centre for Applied
Legal Studies and the Legal Resources Centre. The two South African
NGOs claimed that their presence in the Foresti arbitration would
provide local knowledge and context of the public interest issues at stake,
and could thereby assist ICSID in understanding such issues.36 The two
international petitioners, the Center for International Environmental Law
and the International Centre for the Legal Protection of Human Rights
(the “Human Rights NGOs”), focused on bringing an international or
systemic perspective on the human rights issues addressed in the
arbitration.37
Additionally, the International Commission of Jurists filed a petition
to take part in the proceedings as a non-disputing party (NDP).38 In
29

See Vis-Dunbar, supra note 7.
See id.
31
See id.
32
See, e.g., Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002 s. 17(6) (S.Afr.).
33
See id.
34
Foresti, supra note 4, ¶¶ 1, 54.
35
Human Rights NDP Petition, supra note 6, ¶ 1.
36
See id. ¶¶ 3.1-3.3.
37
See id. ¶¶ 3.4-3.6.
38
Piero Foresti v. Republic of S. Afr., Case No. ARB(AF)/07/01, 3 (Aug. 19, 2009), Petition
for Participation as Non-Disputing Party Pursuant to Article 41(3) of the ICSID Arbitration
(Additional
Facility)
Rules,
available
at
30
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contrast to the perspective that the four other NGOs would bring to
ICSID regarding public interest and human rights issues at stake in the
Foresti arbitration, the International Commission of Jurists intended to
provide context based on the status of international law.39 In response to
these petitions, and after consultation with the parties in dispute, the
ICSID tribunal opted to allow the two sets of non-disputing parties to
participate, stating, “NDP participation is intended to enable NDPs to
give useful information and accompanying submissions to the
Tribunal.”40
V. EXPROPRIATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
To determine whether an expropriation took place in an arbitration
case, ICSID traditionally has looked to whether an expropriation
occurred under international law. According to this standard, an
expropriation occurs where constructive expropriation is found to have
taken place and where the effect on the owner is found to be tantamount
to an expropriation.41 There is considerable legal debate surrounding
South Africa’s transition from the old-order of private ownership of
mineral rights to the new-order of government ownership and licensing
of such rights under the MPRDA, and whether such new-order
government ownership and licensing amounts to expropriation in
Foresti. Interestingly, in a similar South African case, Agri South Africa
v. The Ministers of Minerals and Energy, the High Court of South Africa
held that it was in fact possible for holders of old-order mineral rights to
prove that they had been expropriated and that the holders had rights to
claim compensation for that expropriation pursuant to the MPRDA.42
There is, however, a second and possibly more just method that
ICSID could implore when deciding expropriation arbitration cases such
as Foresti. This method was suggested by the Human Rights NGOs in
the Foresti case. As mentioned above, the issue in Foresti concerned the
“scope of the post-apartheid South African government’s ability, under
http://www.investmenttreatynews.org/documents/p/215/download.aspx [hereinafter ICJ NDP
Petition].
39
See id. ¶ 28.
40
Letter from Eloïse M. Obadia, Secretary of Trib., Int’l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv. Disputes, to
Jason Brickhall, and Carlos Lopez, Senior Legal Officer, Int’l Comm’n of Jurists (October 5, 2009)
(on
file
with
author),
available
at
http://www.investmenttreatynews.org/documents/p/213/download.aspx.
41
See Rudolf Dolzer, Indirect Expropriations: New Developments?, 11 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 64,
79 (2002).
42
See Agri S. Afr. v. Minister of Minerals and Energy 2009 (1) SA 104 (GNP) (S. Afr.).
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domestic and international law, to implement legislative and policy
decisions designed to redress the devastating socio-economic legacy left
by apartheid.”43 The Human Rights NGOs argued that the ICSID tribunal
should take into account the “on-the-ground reality” in South Africa that
vast inequalities exist within the borders of South Africa and “they can
only be corrected through proactive measures” instead of “abstract
economic principles.”44 If ICSID were to consider the reality of
inequality in South Africa, it would likely be much more inclined to
uphold the BEE policies of the MPRDA. In other words, a ruling
allowing South Africa “to implement legislative and policy decisions
designed to redress the devastating socio-economic legacy left by
apartheid” would significantly change the international takings doctrine
by allowing arbitral tribunals to examine the reasons behind legislative
and policy measures and what such measures were meant to achieve,
rather than simply looking at how the owners of property rights were
adversely impacted by such measures.45
ICSID should consider the purposes behind South Africa’s policy
measures for several important reasons. South Africa has obligations that
exist under both domestic and international law to eliminate all forms of
racial discrimination as well as the remnants of the oppressive apartheid
system. These obligations were proposed in the country’s first
democratic Constitution, the International Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, and several other international conventions.46
The United Nations Human Rights Committee has also acknowledged
that the principle of equality sometimes “requires States to take
affirmative action to diminish or eliminate conditions which cause or
perpetuate discrimination prohibited by the Covenant.”47 Thus, on one
hand, a nation must respect its obligations under its BITs to maintain
investor confidence and remain a part of the international business
community, while on the other hand, the same nation must make difficult
choices to respect international social obligations advanced by various
international conventions and found in customary international law. This
conflict may require some nations, such as South Africa, to take
affirmative action measures to correct past social injustices in the least
discriminatory way while minimizing the effect on aggrieved parties and
investors. For these reasons, ICSID should replace the traditional
expropriation test and employ a new one.
43

Human Rights NDP Petition, supra note 6, ¶ 4.2.
Id. ¶ 4.3.
45
Id. ¶ 4.2.
46
See ICJ NDP Petition, supra note 38, ¶ 24.
47
Id. (quoting CCPR Gen. Comment No. 18: Non-Discrimination, thirty-seventh sess., 1989
para. 10) (emphasis added).
44
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A new expropriation test should grant countries the flexibility needed
to implement positive change to correct past social injustices while
maintaining appropriate safeguards. Under this new test, a tribunal
should consider the following three factors when determining whether an
indirect expropriation has taken place: (1) whether there is an
internationally recognized policy goal for the legislation in question, (2)
whether the goal can be accomplished in a less discriminatory way, and
(3) whether the goal can be accomplished while minimizing the effects
on aggrieved parties and investors.
A potential argument against adopting this new test is that arbitral
tribunals will have difficulty determining whether an internationally
recognized policy goal can be accomplished in a less discriminatory way
while minimizing the effects on aggrieved parties and investors due to
the great distance, both geographically and ideologically, between
international adjudicative bodies—such as the arbitral tribunals—and the
on-the-ground-realities seen in countries like South Africa. However, the
participation of non-disputing parties (NDPs) can serve as a solution to
this problem. While an average international tribunal sitting in The
Hague, Geneva, or elsewhere may not know the policy realities of a
capital importing nation, there are likely dozens, if not hundreds, of civil
society organizations with the technical expertise and contextual
knowledge to help the tribunal understand these on-the-ground-realities.
If the ICSID panel in Foresti is any indication, there is an increasing
willingness to make the documents of disputing parties available to
NDPs, allowing for greater expertise and more informed decisions by the
tribunal.48
A tribunal applying this proposed three-factor expropriation test to
the facts in the Foresti case should consider the fact that the BEE
provisions found in the MPRDA are South Africa’s attempt to achieve a
valid international policy goal. In particular, by creating the BEE
provisions of the MPRDA, South Africa was attempting to remedy a
legacy of apartheid as it related to the ownership of mineral rights, a
sector that is imperative to the health of the South African economy. As
mentioned, eliminating legislative discrimination and taking affirmative
steps to remedy past injustices—the policy goals of the BEE
provisions—are recognized by the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.49
48
See, e.g., Elizabeth Whitsitt, An ICSID Tribunal Introduces Innovative Steps into NonDisputing
Party
Procedure,
INVESTMENT
TREATY
NEWS
(Oct.
11,
2009),
http://www.investmenttreatynews.org/cms/news/archive/2009/10/10/an-icsid-tribunal-introducesinnovative-steps-into-non-disputing-party-procedure.aspx.
49
See ICJ NDP Petition, supra note 38, ¶ 24.
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After having considered the first prong of the proposed three-factor
test and having successfully determined that an internationally
recognized policy goal exists for the legislation in question, the tribunal
should consider the final two factors of the test—namely, whether South
Africa could have used less discriminatory means to accomplish the
same policy goal and whether the legislation in question could have been
crafted in such a way that would cause less harm to the aggrieved parties,
such as investors. If claimants are able to demonstrate that such an
alternative means exists, the ICSID tribunal should request NDPs to
provide information revealing whether the adopted legislation was in fact
the least discriminatory and least harmful method of achieving the
desired policy goal—a question of fact that ICSID would likely lack the
expertise to determine. If the adopted policy was the least discriminatory
means possible and there was no way that the policy could have had a
less harmful effect on the claimants, the tribunal should determine that
the policy is a valid “[a]ffirmative Action to diminish or eliminate
conditions which cause or help to perpetuate discrimination”50 under
international law. While such a three-factor test may seem novel, there
has been some movement toward taking a “examine the purposes”
approach in expropriation claims.51 Nevertheless, such an approach has
not become widely accepted in international law because it only focuses
on indirect expropriations created for “legitimate purposes,” which is a
muddled concept of questionable importance when discussing
affirmative steps towards equality.
The three-factor test is advantageous and desirable because it
consolidates the two competing international responsibilities of nations
like South Africa. It also provides incentives for companies and
developing countries to work together in crafting legislation to achieve
policy goals with minimal interference to investor interests. Furthermore,
under the three-factor analysis, corporations and capital importing
countries may be more inclined to form relationships that could lead to
the continuous flow of investments, thereby achieving one of the
fundamental purposes of BITs and the ICSID arbitral system.52
VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPING STATES
All members of the international community struggle to find a
balance between competing international obligations. This struggle is
50
ICJ NDP Petition, supra note 38, ¶ 24 (quoting CCPR Gen. Comment No. 18: NonDiscrimination, thirty-seventh sess., 1989 para. 10).
51
See Dolzer, supra note 41, at 66.
52
See Johanna Kalb, Creating an ICSID Appellate Body, 10 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF.
179, 181 (2005).
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much stronger for developing states. In addition to their dependence on
international investment to bring money and jobs into the country,
developing countries are likely to have histories that require some sort of
egalitarian social transformation as a result of discriminatory systems
such as apartheid, or devastating social events such as civil war, ongoing
civil strife, or coups.53 Social transformation of a developing country can
also be hindered by a legacy of colonialism, poverty, inequity, poor
governance, tropical climate and disease. Identifying some of these
social issues will be beneficial when discussing the advantages of using
the above three-factor analysis to arbitrate matters involving a conflict
between investment obligations stemming from BITs and social
obligations under international and domestic law, such as the BEE
provisions of the MPRDA. To illustrate some of the issues related to
social transformation more clearly, the next section will discuss problems
pertaining to urban/rural wealth gaps as well as problems resulting from
civil upheaval, both of which are commonplace in developing countries.
A. The Urban to Rural Wealth Gap
The first social issue is the prominent urban/rural wealth gap that
exists in much of the world. For example, in Bolivia, one of the most
impoverished states in Latin America, many of the urban elite are of
Spanish ancestry and have historically dominated the country’s economic
and political sectors.54 The majority of rural dwellers, on the other hand,
are subsistence farmers or salt miners, often unable to make ends meet.55
In addition to the income disparity between the two groups, there is also
a disparity in educational opportunities that would serve to eradicate the
wealth gap. Furthermore, while schools are prevalent in urban centers,
there are virtually no schools in rural areas.56
The President of Bolivia, Evo Morales, has vowed to change this
disparity.57 In President Morales’ first term in office, he successfully
passed a new constitution that included many new indigenous rights.58
The new constitution, for example, contains a provision that has the
53
See generally PAUL COLLIER, THE BOTTOM BILLION, 17-19 (2008) (discussing how 73% of
the world’s poorest people live in countries that have either recently been or are currently civil war,
and that by halving a country’s income its statistical likelihood of civil war doubles).
54
Bolivia
Country
Profile,
BBC
NEWS,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/country_profiles/1210487.stm (last updated Dec. 28, 2010)
[hereinafter Bolivia Country Profile].
55
See id.
56
See generally Bolivia: Education for Life and Citizenship, UNICEF.ORG,
http://www.unicef.org/bolivia/education_for_all_1403.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2010).
57
See Bolivia Country Profile, supra note 54.
58
See id.
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potential to give the rural populations control of the natural resources in
their territory.59 This is a substantial change because the country’s
biggest exports are currently natural resources, such as natural gas and
various precious metals.60
In light of this new constitutional provision, one potential solution to
Bolivia’s poverty may lie in its lithium deposits. Bolivia has the world’s
largest supply of lithium, a heavy metal that was thought to be virtually
useless until it gained prominence in batteries for various electronics and
electric cars.61 Because Bolivia’s lithium deposits are found in the Salar
regions, far from any urban centers, President Morales’ new
constitutional provision may have the effect of allocating what could
well be the country’s most important export to Bolivia’s rural population,
nearly all of whom are of indigenous descent.62
President Morales’s new constitution, and its provisions granting
Bolivian citizens in rural areas the right to control the natural resources
in their territories, has not, thus far, conflicted with any of Bolivia’s
BITs. However, if a foreign company held mineral rights prior to the
establishment of President Morales’s constitution, the scenario would be
much like the one in Foresti. Under such a scenario, and assuming that
President Morales’s constitutional provision resulted in an expropriation
of the mineral rights of foreign owned companies, the first step in the
three-factor analysis would be to determine whether such a constitutional
change was made pursuant to an internationally recognized policy goal.
In Bolivia’s case, there seems to be an internationally recognized policy
goal for these provisions. Several conventions declare various rights for
indigenous populations, including the Declaration on the Rights of
Persons belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic
Minorities, the Rio Declaration of Environment and Development, and
the UN General Assembly’s Draft Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples.63 These documents and the overarching principle of
equality included in nearly all international conventions and customary
international law suggest that affirmative steps to redress a legacy of
poverty on indigenous populations are a valid policy goal.
Although the application of the first step in the three-part analysis is
straightforward, the application of the next two steps to this fact pattern
yield uncertain results. In Bolivia’s case, it would be difficult to
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determine whether there exists a less discriminatory means to accomplish
the desired policy goal which is also less harmful to private companies
and investors. In this type of difficult situation, the ICSID tribunal should
rely heavily on NDPs to understand the degree to which President
Morales’s constitutional changes will foster equality in rural areas and
whether the same level of influence could be accomplished in other
ways.
B. Civil Upheaval
A second social issue that developing countries face is the all-toocommon problem of civil upheaval. Civil strife of any kind, including
civil war, inflicts severe ramifications, both human and economic, on the
future of developing nations. Additionally, even when fighting has
ceased, a nation will likely face tremendous obstacles in its struggle to
return to a unified country. The successful unification of a country during
and after civil strife may only be achieved through virulent negotiation,
with all sides making concessions.
Furthermore, although civil strife can fundamentally change the
political atmosphere of a nation—often completely changing the
governmental regime—it usually does not relieve a nation of its
international obligations, which include the nation’s BITs.
To
understand why this is the case, consider the following hypothetical
situation. Imagine a country in civil war where militias in the western
part of the country have waged a multi-year campaign against the
government primarily situated in the eastern part. Furthermore, this
country has considerable mineral wealth concentrated in the western
region. The militias in the west inform the government that they will not
relinquish their arms unless they are granted greater control over the
minerals in their part of the country. The ruling government based in the
east has traditionally contracted with foreign corporations to exploit the
mineral deposits in the west. Additionally, the country’s BITs require
the government to respect the investments of foreign corporations in
these mineral deposits. Nevertheless, the government does not see any
other way to end to the civil war except to accommodate the militias’
request for greater control over mineral rights in the western region.
Thus, the government in the east acquiesces to the demands of the
militia, thereby increasing the militias control over the country’s valuable
mineral rights.
Under the traditional test for expropriation, a tribunal might very
well determine that an expropriation had taken place and quickly grant
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the aggrieved parties an award for compensation from the government.
However, under the three-factor analysis proposed above, the results may
differ substantially. As previously mentioned, before applying the threefactor analysis, a tribunal must first determine that an expropriation has
taken place. In our hypothetical, whether an expropriation has taken
place depends on the level of control taken from the foreign corporations
and given to the militias in the west. Under the facts given, it is likely
that the control given to the militias in the west constitute expropriation
of mineral rights from the foreign corporations that previously held these
rights.
Applying the three-factor test, a tribunal must first determine
whether the government’s act of giving the militias control over mineral
rights held by foreign corporations was done pursuant to an
internationally recognized policy goal. There is little doubt that ending a
civil war and returning a country to peace is a valid policy goal.
Sovereignty and self-determination are two of the founding principles of
the United Nations and there can be no greater goal than a return to these
principles from civil war. Thus, following the second and third prongs of
the test, the tribunal should next determine whether the government
could have stopped the civil war in a less discriminatory manner and
whether the government could have minimized the harm caused to
foreign corporations. These final two factors would depend on whether
there was another way for the government to get the militias to lay down
their arms without ceding control of the mineral rights.
Under this fact scenario, the three-factor analysis may lead a tribunal
to the conclusion that the ongoing civil war permitted the governments
expropriation of mineral rights. However, such a conclusion will not
generally be the case in all expropriations done pursuant to civil war. In
our hypothetical above, it is clear that the mineral wealth located in the
west region was a major reason behind the civil war. Otherwise, greater
control of natural resources would not have sparked negotiations. Most
civil wars are fought for multiple reasons; control of mineral wealth is
only one of many. In a situation where control of mineral wealth is one
of many complaints, there is considerable room for debate over whether
peace can be achieved through expropriation of mineral rights from
foreign investors. Thus, as demonstrated in the above hypothetical, a
government’s responsibility for damages resulting from expropriation
should hinge on whether its actions are reasonable and tailored narrowly
to accomplish an internationally recognized policy goal.
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VII. CONCLUSION
The various scenarios discussed above do not attempt to identify a
bright line rule that must be followed in every situation. Instead, they are
intended to illustrate the flexibility that developing countries require in
international investment disputes—flexibility that is not currently present
in international investment law. Developing countries often have to make
difficult decisions that profoundly affect their futures. Many of these
decisions are based on a lack of financial resources and require difficult
decisions between competing international obligations. For instance,
some countries like South Africa are faced with difficult decisions
pertaining to the redress of past social injustices and the creation of a
unified national identity. International tribunals, including ICSID
tribunals, must allow for these unique circumstances in their proceedings
by implementing a flexible analysis that accounts for internationally
recognized policy goals. One way to offer this level of flexibility is
through the three-factor analysis proposed in this article.
In summary, while we may never know whether an expropriation
did in fact take place in the Foresti case since the parties ultimately
chose to settle outside of the tribunal, due consideration should be given
to the purposes behind expropriation and any alternative means that
could have been used to accomplish the same goals. By using a less rigid
method of analysis in expropriation cases, such as the three-factor
analysis proposed in this article, and by relying heavily on the expertise
of NDPs, developing countries will be better able to participate in the
world of international investment while maintaining the flexibility that
their individual circumstances require.
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